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The ability to share risk efficiently in the economy is essential to welfare and growth. 
However, the increased frequency of natural catastrophes over the last decade has raised once 
again questions associated to the limits of insurability in a free-market economy, and to the 
relevance of public interventions on risk-sharing markets. In this paper, we explore the 
potential reasons for the lack of insurance specifically associated to catastrophe environmental 
risks. Our final aim is to link each source of possible market inefficiency to its possible 
remedies. 
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The standard economic model of risk exchanges predicts that competition on
insurance markets leads to a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation of risks in the econ-
omy. In particular, it states that all diversiﬁable risks in the economy will
be washed away through mutual risk-sharing arrangements. All risks will be
pooled in ﬁnancial and insurance markets. Moreover, the residual systematic
risk in the economy will be borne by the agents who have a comparative ad-
vantage in risk management, as insurers and wealthy investors. In short, it
means that all risks are insurable. This prediction is obviously contradicted
by casual observations. Many diversiﬁable risks are still borne by individ-
uals. Indeed, individual consumption levels are not perfectly correlated in
the population, i.e., for every shock in the economy, they are ”winners” and
”losers”. This is symptomatic of an ineﬃcient risk sharing ex ante. To il-
lustrate, it is believed that most of the supply of insurance coverage against
terrorism risk would have disappeared without a public intervention in the
United States after September 11, 2001. Also, there is ample evidence that
only a limited fraction of homeowners purchase insurance coverage against
earthquakes, ﬂoods and other natural damages in countries without strong
public interventions. Finally , without a considerable internationalization
of insurance and ﬁnancial markets, we may expect that risks associated to
climate changes will be favorable to some countries and detrimental to others.
The adverse consequences of the limits to insurability are generally over-
whelmingly underestimated. The management of risks and the management
of production cannot be disentangled without a eﬃcient risk-sharing markets.
It forces small entrepreneurs to bear the risk linked to their investment. It
yields a reduction in investment, employment and growth. In addition, the
inability of our economies to eﬃciently transfer risks aﬀecting human capital
forces households to bear a larger risk over their lifetime. Given risk aversion,
it has a dramatic adverse eﬀect on welfare.
The possibility to transfer a risk on the market place is contingent upon
whether the buyer is ready to pay a larger price than the minimum price
at which the seller is ready to sell. Consequently, the concept of a limit to
insurability cannot be deﬁned only on the distributional characteristics of the
risk, but it should also take into account the economic environment. Berliner
(1982) enumerates the criteria to deﬁne insurability. The actuarial view on
this problem is usually summarized by stating that a risk is insurable if the
1Law of Large Numbers is at work. It means that the maximum potential loss
may not be inﬁnite, or very large. Similarly, risks should not be too much
positively correlated. In addition, it means that insurers should not accept
risks with a too low probability of occurrence. Also, the risk must exist: a
realized risk cannot be insured. The legal environment must be stable, or
predictable. Finally, an objective distribution function can be estimated.
This deﬁnition is not entirely satisfactory. As said before, a transaction
on the market is possible if the two parties are willing to transfer the under-
lying ”good” against a speciﬁc price. This joint willingness can exist only if
the seller and the buyer ﬁnd it advantageous to exchange. We deﬁne a risk
as being uninsurable if, given the economic environment, no mutually ad-
vantageous risk transfer can be exploited by the consumer and the suppliers
of insurance. Partial uninsurability occurs when the parties can exploit only
part of the mutually advantageous transfer of risk. Whether there exists a
mutually advantageous risk exchange between the two parties is an interest-
ing question that has been examined by several authors as Arrow (1965),
Borch (1960), Raviv (1979) and Aase (1993). The basic model is a perfect
competitive insurance market in which it clearly appears that indeed the
Law of Large Numbers plays an important role to evaluate the social surplus
of the transfer of risks. But, contrary to the standard actuarial view, the
maximum potential loss and the probability of loss have an ambiguous eﬀect
on the size of the transfer of risk at equilibrium. In addition some factors
as the degree of risk aversion of the agent , or her degree of optimism, are
crucial in the insurability of risks in the economy.
The actuarial view on the limits of insurability appears to be too narrow.
After all, the Lloyd’s accepted to underwrite the risk of the capture of the
monster of Loch Ness, and more standard insurance companies cover the risk
of failure of Ariane V, the new European satellite launcher on which no data
is available. Moreover, many risks on which the Law of Large Numbers could
be used are beyond the limits of insurability. One cannot ﬁnd insurers that
would accept the risks of the absence of promotion, or of divorce.
The objective of this paper is to provide some insights on the recent de-
velopments on the economic analysis of the limits of insurability, speciﬁcally
for catastrophic risks. There is no uniﬁed theory for it. Rather, there are a
large set of economic reasonings explaining why some risks cannot be insured
on the marketplace. All of them are related to a modiﬁcation of one of the
assumption in the Arrow-Borch standard model of perfect competition on
2insurance markets.
2 The classical Arrow-Borch model of eﬃ-
c i e n tr i s ks h a r i n g
Economists1 have developed during the last thirty years a canonical model
to deal with optimal insurance/risk-sharing and risk prevention. Our aim
in this section is to review the assumptions and basic results of this simple
model.
In the classical risk-sharing model, there is a large number of agents in
the economy. Each agent has a risky endowment. Correlation among these
risks is allowed. Agents are expected-utility maximizers, with an increasing
and concave utility function. The following assumptions are made:
• There is no transaction cost.
• The distribution function of risks is common knowledge.
• The distribution function can depend upon prevention eﬀorts by the
agents. Eﬀorts are observable at no cost.
• Losses are observable at no cost.
• There is full liability.
• The model is static, or there exists a complete set of insurance markets
for future risks.
Under these conditions, we obtain the following well-known results:
• To each possible event aﬀecting at least one agent, there will be a
competitive market for claims contingent to that event. Agents will
exchange bundles of state-contingent contracts that can be analyzed as
an insurance contract. Competitive markets generate a Pareto-eﬃcient
allocation of risks in the economy in the sense that there exists no other
feasible allocation of risks that would increase the expected utility of an
1See Borch (1962), Arrow (1953), Mossin (1968), Raviv (1978) and Gollier (1992).
3agent without reducing the expected utility of at least another agent.
This allocation will satisfy the mutuality principle which states that
everyone’s ﬁnal wealth depends only upon the aggregate wealth of the
economy in the corresponding state. Namely, if there are two states
of nature with the same aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth
among agents will be the same in the two states. This guarantees that
all diversiﬁable risks are washed away. In particular, if there is no sys-
tematic risk in the economy, the aggregate wealth is certain, and by
the mutuality principle, so will be the individual wealth levels. If a
systematic risk exists, its sharing in the population satisﬁes a simple
risk-sharing rule: the sensitivity of an individual’s ﬁnal wealth to the
aggregate wealth in the economy is inversely proportional to its Arrow-
Pratt degree of absolute risk aversion. In short, this means that more
risk-averse agents should bear a larger share of the aggregate risk. Ob-
serve that this implies that all agents in the economy should participate
to the bearing of the collective risk. 2
• Despite risks depend upon eﬀorts to prevent them, there is no moral
hazard problem. Indeed, since eﬀorts are observable, each party will
condition the acceptance of the contract to strict requirement on risk
prevention by the other party. Contractors will privately trade-oﬀ their
cost of eﬀort to the beneﬁts of risk-sharing generated by the contract.
For example, an insurer will provide a better premium rate to those
entrepreneurs who accept to invest in ﬁre sprinklers in their buildings.
The competitive equilibrium yields a socially eﬃcient level of risk pre-
vention. To illustrate the idea, if there is no systematic risk, or if there
is a risk-neutral agent in the economy, at equilibrium a 1 euro increase
in prevention eﬀort by any agent generates a 1 euro increase in expected
aggregate wealth in the economy.
We conclude that in the classical problem of insurance and risk preven-
tion, there is no need for public intervention. Risk are eﬃciently spread in
the economy. This means in particular that agents are fully insured if risks
are diversiﬁable. If they are not, the risk will be spread to the largest pos-
sible community. Also, agents get the good incentives to invest in a socially
2See Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) for a synthesis on Pareto-eﬃcient and competitive
risk-sharings.
4eﬃcient level of risk prevention. These results do not ﬁt with the real world.
Insurance and reinsurance mechanisms are good in spreading standard risks
in a very eﬃcient way over a worldwide community of investors who get a
return for the portfolio risk they take. This is the case for automobile, ﬁre
and most liability risks for example. This is not the case for most natural
risks. In the next sections, we review the reasons why the classical model
fails to explain why these risks are hard to insure by the market. We also
explore how private-public partnerships can improve eﬃciency.
3T r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s
The prevalence of transaction costs in the insurance industry is a well-
established fact. For many insurance lines like automobile insurance, trans-
action costs amount up to 30% of the premium. This is a striking diﬀerence
with respect to ﬁnancial markets, where transaction costs are generally not
larger than 2 or 3%. It is easy to understand why insurance markets are
faced with much larger transaction costs: insurance contracts are tailored to
individual risks, which are diﬃcult to observe. Insurance companies must
therefore develop expensive technologies to audit individual risks, both ex-
ante and ex-post. These costs are eventually passed on to the policyholder
through a loading on the premium. On the contrary, ﬁnancial contracts or-
ganize the sharing of standardized, aggregate risks that are easy to observe
at low cost.
The existence of transaction costs is especially crucial in the case of
catastrophic risks. Catastrophic risks are likely to trigger waves of claims
from policyholders hit by the same event all at the same time. Auditing
these simultaneous claims in a reasonable delay requires a large capacity of
auditors. Because auditing technology is expected to exhibit decreasing re-
turns to scale, the expected auditing cost per customers is likely to be larger
for catastrophe risks relative to other insurance lines. In the same spirit,
the limited auditing capacity will force insurance companies to randomize
audits when faced to waves of claims. This is anticipated by opportunistic
policyholders who can be tempted to exaggerate their losses when a catastro-
phe occurs. As a consequence, the problem of transaction costs on insurance
m a r k e t si sm a g n i ﬁe di nt h ec a s eo fc a t a s t r o p h i cr i s k s .
How do transaction costs aﬀect the insurability of risks? There is no doubt
5that some individuals with a low degree of risk aversion will ﬁnd these costs
too expensive with respect to the beneﬁt of the coverage. In fact, Mossin
(1968) proved that it is never optimal to purchase full insurance when the
premium contains a proportional loading. Thus, transaction costs is a source
of partial uninsurability. More interestingly, Arrow (1965) showed that the
optimal form of insurance contract is a contract with full insurance above
a straight deductible if the loading only depends upon the actuarial value
of the contract, i.e. the expected indemnity. Deductible insurance is a best
compromise between the willingness to cover larger risk and the objective to
limit transaction costs. The intuition is that the willingness to pay for cover-
a g ed e p e n d su p o nt h ev a r i a n c eo fl o s s e s .W h e no n er e d u c e st h es i z et of the
risk, the willingness to pay for insurance decreases as t2, whereas deadweight
transaction costs decrease as t. It implies that only large risks are insured.
This is in contradiction with the observation that one has no problem to
ﬁnd insurance against cracks in one’s windshield, but one cannot easily ﬁnd
insurance against much larger risks as earthquake insurance. We conclude
that the existence of transaction costs is not a convincing explanation for
insurance market failures for large risks.
The above argument holds speciﬁcally in the classical expected utility
model. This model has been challenged for two decades by some economists
and psychologists on the basis that it is only an approximation of house-
holds’ attitudes toward risk. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
performed experiments that tended to establish that people are much more
aﬀected by losses than by gains in wealth. That ”loss aversion” should raise
the demand for insurance, thereby making the transaction costs argument as
a source of uninsurability even less credible.
The question is thus how to reduce transaction costs on catastrophe in-
surance markets. As explained above, transaction costs are large because the
individual indemnity is a function of the individual loss, which is costly to
observe. A standard response of the market is to impose a (partially disap-
pearing) deductible, which implies that only policyholders with a loss larger
than the deductible will submit a claim. As shown by Gollier (1987), this is
as o c i a l l ye ﬃcient solution when there is a ﬁxed cost per claim. A solution is
to relate the indemnity to something th a ti se a s i e rt oo b s e r v e .F o re x a m p l e ,
an insurance strategy would be to oﬀer contracts that are contingent only to
an index of aggregate loss in the community to which the agent belongs. Of
course, this raises the issue of the management of the basis risk by the pol-
6icyholders, but it yields the beneﬁt generated by the low observability cost
of the aggregate loss index. An extreme example of this strategy is provided
by the development of ”cat bond” markets during the last decade.
4I n e ﬃcient ﬁnancial markets
Financial markets are a natural place to organize the sharing of individ-
ual risks. In fact, insurers and reinsurers should be analyzed as ﬁnancial
intermediaries that ”package” individual risks before transferring it to the
market. The wave of securitization of individual risks observed during the
last decade raises the question of why ﬁnancial intermediation is necessary.
In addition to the above-mentioned remark that markets may ﬁnd it hard to
monitor individual risks, it has long been documented that ﬁnancial markets
have been quite ineﬃcient to spread risks to the largest possible community
of economic agents. Two problems are particularly relevant for managing
catastrophic risks: limited participation of individuals to ﬁnancial markets
and the international diversiﬁcation puzzle. Both problems yield an inef-
ﬁciently large risk premium in the insurance tariﬀs for catastrophic risks,
yielding in turn an insurability problem.
The existence of various participation costs to ﬁnancial markets implies
that only the wealthier fraction of the population will invest in the stock
market. Given that many people do not hold any stock portfolio, they do
not hold shares of (re)insurance companies that are considering covering
catastrophic risks. The remaining shareholders will require a larger risk pre-
mium to participate, because of the larger size of the risk. Since the risk
premium increases as the square of the size of the risk, this can generate a
sizeable eﬀect on the risk premium, and in turn on the insurability problem.
Another argument is based on the international diversiﬁcation puzzle, as
stated by French and Poterba (991), and Baxter and Jermann (1997). They
reported that US investors hold around 94% of their ﬁnancial assets in the
form of US securities. In Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany, the port-
folio share of domestic assets exceeds 85% in each case. Whereas this eﬀect is
mitigated by the existence of international reinsurance treaties, it shows that
catastrophic risks are not as much geographically disseminated as suggested
by the theory. A possible explanation for the home bias of individual port-
folios comes from various tax incentives for retirement funds to invest within
7the country. We believe that relaxing these investment constraints would
alleviate the insurability problem for catastrophic risks by reducing the risk
premium requested by shareholders of (re)insurance company to bear them.
We endorse the proposal of Robert Shiller (1993) to create new markets
for claims on various indexes related to national incomes, or to these so-
called new risks for which the current allocation is obviously ineﬃcient. For
example, an international mutualization of the risk of climate change would
be very helpful, as we believe that most of it can be diversiﬁed away. Such
an international risk-sharing can be attained either through a formal risk-
sharing treaty among diﬀerent countries, or through the creation of claims on
regional indexes of damages generated by climate changes. Super-terrorism
could be treated in a similar manner. A diﬃculty of the system comes from
the moral hazard problem that large risk-sharing arrangements generate.
Another diﬃculty, which is speciﬁc to the international treaty system, is due
to the long-term commitment that such sharing device requires.
5 Asymmetric information
Since the seminal paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), it is recognized
that the fact that insurers face an heterogeneous population of consumers is
as o u r c eo fi n e ﬃciency on insurance markets. Suppose that individual risks
are heterogeneous in the population, and the observable characteristic of the
agents are not perfectly correlated to the intensity of their risk. The adverse
selection problem originates from the observation that if insurance companies
calculate the premium rate on the basis of the average probability distribution
in the population, the less risky agents will purchase less insurance than
riskier agents. In the extreme case, the low-risk agent will ﬁnd the premium
rate too large with respect to their actual probability of loss. They will
prefer not to insure their risk. Insurers will anticipate this reaction, and
they will increase the premium rate to break even only on the population of
high-risk policyholders. The presence of high-risk agents generates a negative
externality to lower-risk agents who are unable to ﬁnd an insurance premium
at an acceptable premium rate. The policy recommendation that is relevant
to reduce adverse selection is to make public all relevant information about
risks. For example, insurers should be allowed to know whether the potential
policyholder is highly exposed to some environmental risk.
8However, allowing insurance companies to discriminate price according
to their information about the risk exposure of their customers raises an
ethical issue. Suppose that the riskier group of agents is on average poorer
than the less exposed group. Price discrimination on the insurance market
would raise the premium rate for poorer consumers. Beside the redistrib-
utional issue, this may yield a solvency problem of the insurance demand.
These two problems can be solved by imposing a no-discrimination rule to
insurance companies (Rochet (1991)). In order to eliminate the adverse se-
lection problem that this policy recommendation yields, it is necessary to
combine the no-discrimination rule with making insurance coverage manda-
tory. This is what is done for example in France in the case of insurance
of natural catastrophes. Given the diﬃculties to regulate insurance markets
in this way, one should think of the alternative policy that would consist
in redistributing wealth among low-risk and high-risk customers through a
simple tax scheme.
The population of risks can be heterogeneous not only because agents
bear intrinsically diﬀerent risks, but also because they do not invest the same
amount of their energy, wealth, or time to risk prevention. In particular, it
has long been recognized that individuals that are better covered by insurance
invest less in risk prevention if the link between the premium rate and the size
of these investments is weak. It will be the case if insurers are not in a position
to observe the investment in risk prevention by the insuree. In that case, the
premium rate is not sensitive to the eﬀort made by the policyholder to prevent
losses. Obviously, contrary to the result of the classical model, there will be
an inverse relationship between risk prevention and insurance coverage. The
level of risk prevention will be ineﬃcient. This is moral hazard. Anticipating
this low degree of prevention and the higher frequency of losses that it entails,
insurers will raise their premium rate, inducing policyholders to reduce their
coverage. At the limit, no insurance can be an (ineﬃcient) equilibrium. The
moral hazard problem is particularly crucial when policyholders have a large
control of their risk. To illustrate, this is why it is not possible to insure
against many environmental and technological risks.
The policy recommendation to ﬁght against ex ante moral hazard is the
enforcement of norms for risk prevention. This is the case for environmental
risks in which ships transporting chemical products have to satisfy several
safety requirements that are imposed by regulatory agencies. Automobile
driving norms are also standard, as speed limits, alcohol-free driving,.... Why
9these norms are mostly organized by a regulatory agency rather than by in-
surers is not completely clear. One reason is due to the combination of
negative externalities and limited liability. If they are more than one prin-
cipal supervising the implementation of norms, the information among the
diﬀerent principals should be pooled to save on monitoring costs. Heal and
Kunreuther (2003) argue that a centralized prevention system can be useful
to solve the ”tragedy of commons” coming from the fact that each agent’s
eﬀort yields an externality on the other policyholders’ risk.
Another policy recommendation is to allow insurers to discriminate prices
among diﬀerent policyholders. Allowing for discrimination is a way to provide
incentive to policyholders to invest in risk-reducing activities. In France
again, insurers are not allowed to discriminate premium rate for natural
risks. The consequence are by now obvious: many households built their
house in areas that were secularly known to be ﬂooded periodically. The
absence of actuarial insurance pricing was supposed to be counterbalanced
by the imposition of strict norms for where to build houses. But these norms
have never been written.
6 Limited liability
Firms generate environmental risks that are borne by third parties. This
raises the question of who should bear the burden of the risk. In most
countries, ﬁrms found liable to a damage to others must indemnify them
accordingly. This is done to force ﬁrms to internalize all costs generated by
their choice. But indemniﬁcation is possible only up to the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
capacity. Limited liability is a way to protect risk-takers against an excessive
ﬁnancial distress. But it has long been recognized that limited liability dis-
torts the decision of the risk-taker in a way that is socially ineﬃcient. This
is because the limited liability gives ﬁrms the equivalent of a free put option.
Put it in simpler terms, under limited liability, an insolvent ﬁrm can only
beneﬁt from taking more risk, because it does not bear the burden of losses.
Therefore, if it is risk-neutral, it will seek to maximize the expectation of
a convex function of its equity. As a result, it will systematically exhibit
a risk-loving behavior, and adopt a very risky attitude that can be labelled
”bet for resurrection”. This is a kind of moral hazard problem. Risk aversion
mitigates this result, but only for agents who are well capitalized, as shown
10by Koehl, Gollier and Rochet (1997). To sum up, it is likely that insurance
markets for environmental liability risks will not work eﬃciently, even when
risks are eﬃciently priced by insurance companies. Another way of looking
at this problem is that the insurance contract creates a ”deep pocket” where
victims can ﬁnd compensation for their losses.
Limited liability thus raises several important questions. How to organize
compensation for those who bear the negative environmental externalities?
How to build an incentive-compatible mechanism that increases loss preven-
tion by ﬁrms? How to force ﬁrms not to under-capitalize their subsidiaries
which are in charge of managing the riskiest part of the business? Two
routes have been used. The ﬁrst one is compulsory insurance. This solves
the misallocation of risk in the economy and the organization of a system to
compensate the victims. But, most of the time, compulsory insurance has
been funded by a ﬂat, non-discriminatory, non-incentive-compatible insur-
ance tariﬀ. The policyholder’s investment in loss prevention is not observed
by the fund, either because it is diﬃcult to get information on it, or because
the fund did not get the good incentive to organize an incentive-compatible
system.
The second route has been to organize ”deep pocket” for decision makers.
Under the US CERCLA, when a bank has been closely involved in the mon-
itoring of a ﬁrm’s activities, it may be considered as liable for cleaning up
the environmental damages generated by the insolvent ﬁrm. The objective
of this strategy is to force risk-takers to internalize the full cost of potential
losses: banks will increase the loan rate of riskier ﬁrms, and they will have the
good incentive to monitor their environmental risks. However, as observed
by Boyer and Laﬀont (1995), there is no reason to believe that the insurer
can monitor the ﬁrm at no cost. As a consequence, the CERCLA legislation
introduces more asymmetric information on credit markets. There will be
more credit rationing, the cost of capital will be larger, and the structure of
banking contracts for ﬁrms will be aﬀected. Is insurability worth this cost?
The existence of extensive bankruptcy costs on ﬁnancial markets implies
that catastrophe risks cannot be insured without the government paying the
role of reinsurer of last resort. This is a key element in the success of both
the terrorism risk insurance (TRIA) program in the United States, and the
insurance of natural catastrophes in F r a n c ef o re x a m p l e . I ti sn o t e w o r t h y
that this public intervention to the allocation of risk in the economy is viable
only if it is clearly deﬁned ex-ante. This is a prerequisite for the eﬃcient
11functioning of the (re)insurance markets.
7 Lack of predictability
There are many instances in which the random variable describing the risk
has no objective probability distribution. This can be due to the absence of
historical data. Or because of our imperfect scientiﬁc knowledge, for those
who believe in a deterministic world. To illustrate, who knows the actual
probability distribution of a major leak in some speciﬁc type of nuclear plan,
the probability of transmission to the human being of the so-called ”mad cow”
disease, the probability of failure of the new European satellite launcher Ar-
iane V, or the probability of the average temperature of the earth increasing
by more than 3 degrees Celsius over the next century? The lack of pre-
dictability can also be due to a volatile environment, as is the case for future
liability rules of the environmental policy in many countries. The ambiguity
about the probability distribution raises several questions. Is it suﬃcient
to explain the insurability problem typically associated to ambiguous risks?
H o wt oc a l c u l a t eaf a i ri n s u r a n c ep r e m i u m ?H o wt oe v a l u a t et h eb e n e ﬁts of
an insurance contract for the insuree? What would be an eﬃcient allocation
of risks in the economy?
Cabantous (2003) examined this question through the following experi-
ments. Seventy-eight french underwriters were asked to price two diﬀerent
risks. Risk 1 yields a loss L with an unambiguous probability p =0 .2%. Risk
2 yields the same loss in case of accident, but we don’t know the true proba-
bility of an accident. It can be either pmin =0 .1% or pmax =0 .3% with equal
probability. Thus, without any additional information, the prior probability
of accident is the same for the two risks, i.e., they have the same uncondi-
tional actuarial value. In spite of this obvious fact, the french underwriters
priced risk 2 at a much larger rate than risk 1. More precisely, risk 1 was
priced with a loading factor of 35% on average, whereas risk 2 had a load-
ing factor more than doubled at 78% of the actuarial value. Underwriters
seems to behave as if they would put a very large subjective probability of
the worse scenario p = pmax, which is typical of what economists use to refer
to ”ambiguity aversion”. The concept of ambiguity aversion has received a
precise theoretical content by the works of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
This large premium rate generated by the insurers’ ambiguity aversion can
12potentially explain why the demand for insurance for ambiguous risks is so
s m a l la tt h a tp r i c e .
Notice that if both the policyholder and the insurer have the same de-
gree of ambiguity aversion, they should use the same p to compute expected
utility on one side, and the actuarial value of the policy on the other side.
This should not introduce any speciﬁc insurability problem. The ambiguity
raises the premium required by the insurer to accept to cover the risk, but it
also raises the policyholder’s willingness to pay for insurance. An insurability
problem may occur only if insurers are systematically more ambiguity-averse
than consumers. Kunreuther, Hogarth and Meszaros (1993) conducted a
series of studies to determine the degree of ambiguity aversion of insurers.
They showed that many of them may exhibit quite a large degree of such
an aversion. For which reasons this is the case remains an open question.
This could for example come from an incentive problem. Underwriters are
usually much more penalized when it happens ex-post that they ”underesti-
mated” the risk of loss than when they ”overestimated” it. Underestimation
leads to the much visible problem for the company to face a loss ratio much
larger than unity (asbestos in the US, transfused blood scandal in France,...).
Overestimation yields unearned potential proﬁts that are usually not even
mentioned by the principal. Thus, underwriters would not be ”genetically”
more ambiguity-averse. Rather, they react to biased incentives. Solving this
uninsurability problem requires a modiﬁcation of incentive schemes for un-
derwriters.
8 Dynamic aspects of insurability
8.1 Implicit risk-sharing versus insurance
A substitute for market insurance is to organize an implicit or explicit system
of solidarity for the unlucky citizens through an indemnity ﬁnanced by the
taxpayers. Social security is the most obvious example. The decision of the
US government to compensate the relatives of the victims of September 11
and the shareholders of airline companies is another example. France is the
prefect example of a country that established an implicit system of solidarity
for unlucky citizens. Farmers and truck drivers for example can rely on the
state to get compensations for adverse shocks to their proﬁts. Victims of
13ﬂoods may expect to get indemnities that depend upon the power of their
local representatives at the Parliament.
The solidarity system yields problems that are similar to those of the
market insurance: adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud. Moreover,
if the system is implicit, it generates some uncertainty about the level of
the indemnity, because of the political nature of the intervention. But the
most important diﬃculty is related to the non-stability of the coexistence
of the solidarity system. If citizens believe that the state will compensate
them for their damages, they will prefer not to insure the risk. Ex-post, the
absence of insurance coverage forces the state to intervene. This is a case
of self-fulﬁlling prophecy. One can mitigate this problem by asking the
state to specify explicitly the conditions and the limits of national solidarity.
However, such a commitment may be diﬃcult. Ex-post, the social pressure
for the public indemniﬁcation of the uninsured victims of a much publicized
catastrophe will be strong. Solidarity kills market insurance. This problem
can also be mitigated by oﬀering public indemnities that are not contingent
to the existence of an insurance contract covering the victim’s loss.
An essential aspect of the policy issue here is thus the ability of the
State to commit itself on an ex-post treatment of the victims of natural
catastrophes. This commitment can be organized through a speciﬁcl a w
organizing solidarity mechanisms under speciﬁcr u l e s ,a sd o n ef o re x a m p l eb y
the United States through the passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002. Delegating the management of the solidarity scheme to an independent
institution is an alternative strategy to this commitment problem.
8.2 Realized risk
Individual risks exhibit serial correlations through time. For example, a site
that already experienced many tornadoes is likely to be exposed to other
tornadoes in the future. If allowed to do that, competitive insurers will
certainly use these historical data to price these individual risks. The extreme
form of this is a ”realized risk” in which the evolution of the random variable
in the future became deterministic, given the current situation. Obviously,
there exists no mutually advantageous risk transfer in this case. In short,
one cannot insure a risk ex-post.
The same kind of problem arises from other sources of information. For
example, the improvement of our ability to forecast future earthquakes or
14terrorist attacks inﬂicts high stress to the sustainable long-term relationship
between insurers and policyholders. An international climatic risk-sharing
arrangement could be organized only as long as our scientiﬁck n o w l e d g ei s
insuﬃcient to predict which countries will beneﬁt from the climate change,
and which ones will have to bear most of the damages. Hirshleifer (1971)
already noticed that more information can have a negative value for Society.
Early information on risks will make these risks uninsurable. This so-called
”Hirshleifer eﬀect” may be escaped if insurance could be organized prior to
the revelation of the information.
This phenomenon indicates the importance for insurance markets to es-
tablish long-term relationships between the buyer and the seller of a risk.
Insurance for environmental risks would have a much smaller value if, at
any time, one party could renege the contract contingent to new information
about the risk exposure of the policyholder. This links this discussion to the
assumption made in the classical model that there exist insurance markets
for future risks.
8.3 Time diversiﬁcation and catastrophe loan programs
Risks can be transferred between individuals, but it can also be transferred
through time via the credit markets. Economic agents can forearm them-
selves in the face of uncertainty by building ﬁnancial reserves. In the face
of random shocks on their future revenues, they can reduce the volatility of
their consumption by reducing their reserves in case of an adverse shocks,
and by increasing their reserves in the absence of catastrophes. This buﬀer
stocks strategy has been examined by Yaari (1976), Deaton (1991) and Gol-
lier (1994) for consumers in a life-cycle model. Yaari (1976) showed that
an agent with an inﬁnite time horizon and with risks that are indepen-
dent through time would ”time-diversify” his risks by an eﬃcient borrowing-
lending strategy that perfectly smooths his consumption through time. No
costly insurance would be necessary in this case.
Contrary to this theory, the ”time-diversiﬁcation” strategy is actually not
a perfect substitute to insurance because agents have a ﬁnite lifetime, and
because consumers face borrowing constraints. In particular, they cannot
borrow in case of an ”early hit” of damages that dries up their initial ﬁ-
nancial reserve. This is particularly a problem for catastrophe risks in spite
of the low probability of occurrence, since the buﬀer stock to build to fore-
15arm oneself against the consequences of the damage is necessarily huge. A
standard governmental policy in situations where a large population hit by a
catastrophe faces a borrowing constraint is to provide subsidized governmen-
tal loans. Gollier (2003) considers a standard lifecycle model that can be used
to measure the beneﬁt of relaxing individual borrowing constraints. We have
shown that the marginal beneﬁt of governmental loan programs is marginal
when an eﬃcient insurance market exists, but easing borrowing constraints
when risks are diﬃcult to insure may have a large eﬀect on welfare.
This analysis can be reinterpreted for insurance companies determining
their strategies of capital accumulation and reinsurance. A starting insurance
company has a low capacity to retain risks. It is thus forced to reinsure a
large part of its business. If it is not caught by an ”early hit” of catastrophic
indemnities, its capacity to retain risk will grow. This will increase the
capacity of the market. The ability of insurance companies to transfer wealth
through time is thus central for organizing time diversiﬁcation of catastrophic
risks. But the modern theory of corporate ﬁnance indicates that managers in
ﬁrms with a large ﬁnancial reserve will be less eﬃcient than managers in less
capitalized ﬁrms where their job is at stake. Managerial ineﬃciencies open
the door to raiders who could use the cash reserve of the insurance company
for his own purpose. The bottom line is that it can be hard for insurance
companies to accumulate ﬁnancial reserves. This has an adverse eﬀect on
the capacity of the insurance market.
When catastrophic risks are diﬃcult to insure, time diversiﬁcation may
provide a good substitute. Because consumers and insurance companies may
face diﬃculties to smooth shocks through buﬀer stocks and borrowing, the
state may be in a better situation to organize time diversiﬁcation. The state
has the credit worthiness and the long time horizon that are necessary to
implement time diversiﬁcation eﬃciently. As explained before, the best way
to do this is likely to ask the state government to play the role of reinsurer
of last resort, a backstop, by oﬀering reinsurance contracts with a deductible
corresponding to the capacity of the insurance market. The moral hazard
problem that it generates should be mitigated by the usual methods (experi-
ence rating, norms of prevention,...). A frequent reassessment of the market
conditions should be performed in order to leave maximum freedom to the
market capacity.
169C o n c l u s i o n
Insurance plays a key role in the functioning of our modern economies. Insur-
ance contracts transfer individual risks to ﬁnancial markets through share-
holders of insurance companies. It allows for a reduction of risks borne by
Society through diversiﬁcation. It also allows for transferring risks to agents
that have a comparative advantage to bear risks, i.e. more risk-tolerant
agents. The added value for the economy is considerable: it directly increases
the welfare of the risk-averse policyholders, but it also induce risk-averse en-
trepreneurs to invest more in risky activities, thereby increasing growth and
employment.
This view on the functioning of our economies is idealistic. There are
several reasons for why a large proportion of uncertain events cannot be in-
sured eﬃciently by competitive insurance markets, particularly those related
to natural catastrophes. In this paper, we surveyed some of them, and in par-
ticular the inability to smooth catastrophic shocks over time due to solvency
issues and liquidity constraints, the absence of objective probabilities, the
large transaction costs of auditing large waves of claims simultaneously, and
the Samaritan syndrome. We also discussed various strategies to remedy the
economic eﬃciencies that are generated by this insurability problem. The
optimal public-private partnership is obtained by combining the advantages
of the two systems. Private insurers and reinsurers are good at selecting,
pricing and monitoring individual risks and at auditing claims. They can
eﬃciently transfer a ﬁrst layer of these risks to ﬁnancial markets. But they
are not good at retaining the upper layer of aggregate risks, given the sol-
vency constraints that prohibit them to smooth shocks over time. The State
can eﬃciently do that by using its ability to tax citizens both before and
after catastrophes occur, thereby time-diversifying catastrophic risks. This
is why it should play the role of reinsurer of last resort. A key element to the
success of this public intervention is that the rules deﬁning the conditions of
the public reinsurance be completely explicit. This is only in this way that
we will put to a minimum the ineﬃciencies inherent to any public regulation,
in particular those related to the crowding out of private insurance by public
solidarity.
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